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Abstract 
While brand punishment – through either individual or collective action – has received ample 
attention by consumer psychologists, absent from this literature is that such punishment can take 
the form of unethical actions that can occur even when the consumer is not personally harmed. 
Across three studies, we examine consumers’ propensity to act unethically towards a brand that 
they perceive to be harmful. We document that when consumers come to see brands as harmful – 
even in the absence of a direct, personal transgression – they can be motivated to seek retribution 
in the form of unethical intentions and behaviors. That is, consumers are more likely to lie, cheat, 
or steal to punish a harmful brand. Drawing on these findings, we advance implications for 
consumer psychologists and marketing practitioners and provide avenues for future research in 
the area. 
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In 2015, a group known as The Impact Team unscrupulously hacked into Avid Life 
Media (AshleyMadison.com), an online service arranging marital infidelity, and released the 
names of 37 million users. The motivation behind this unethical attack was not merely that Avid 
Life Media helped promote extra-marital affairs, but that the company engaged in morally 
dubious business practices (e.g., demanding money to delete a customer’s account; Watson, 
2015). The event caused a whirlwind of media attention and many lauded the attack. Despite the 
attention these actions garner, the consumer psychology literature is relatively silent on these 
types of consumer attacks. In light of this limited research, we seek to understand what drives 
individuals to demand no financial incentives, act immorally, and even risk prolonged 
imprisonment to punish a company that had not directly wronged them.  
Extant research has demonstrated that when companies and brands commit specific 
transgressions – such as product or service failures – it typically results in punishment by 
consumers in the form of diminished positive attitudes (Dawar & Lei, 2009), reduced patronage, 
fewer repurchases (Huber et al., 2010), and boycotts (John & Klein, 2003). Other research has 
shown that in response to a direct personal transgression, consumers are likely to punish brands 
in the form of complaining or negative word-of-mouth (Grégoire & Fisher, 2006, 2008). 
However, absent from this literature is an examination of consumers’ propensity to punish 
brands by engaging in unethical behavior. Unethical behaviors are those that violate a generally 
accepted set of moral norms or principles (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007; Treviño, Weaver, & 
Reynolds, 2006) and commonly include behaviors such as lying, cheating, and stealing. For 
example, complaining about a negative consumer experience would not violate the moral 
principle of honesty, whereas fabricating a negative consumer experience would. Importantly, 
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while illegal actions tend to be unethical, not all unethical behavior is necessarily illegal (e.g., the 
act of lying). 
The impact of this unethical consumer behavior is emphasized by its effect on firms’ 
bottom lines. For example, consider the $9.1 billion in losses reported each year by US retailers 
due to legal acts such as consumer wardrobing and return fraud (Prevent Loss, 2015), or the 
$16.7 billion in losses due to the illegal act of shoplifting (CNBC, 2015). In light of these 
statistics, the current research explores consumers’ perceptions of brand harmfulness to 
determine whether and how consumers pursue unethical actions to punish brands, and if this 
behavior occurs even when direct, personal brand transgressions are not present. More 
specifically, it is predicted that when people feel that a company is harmful, they are more likely 
to behave unethically towards it. A pilot study (N = 85) was conducted to examine this 
prediction using real-world retail theft data (Global Retail Theft Barometer, Checkpoint Systems, 
2014). Results indicate that retailer category shoplifting rates are significantly correlated with 
consumer perceptions of retailer harmfulness ( = .086, p < .05; see Methodological Details 
Appendix (MDA) for Pilot Study): people tend to shoplift more from harmful companies. 
Parsing out this issue of unethical consumer behavior, the current research delivers 
important contributions to research in consumer psychology. First, we demonstrate that 
consumers are willing to undertake unethical actions to punish brands that they perceive to be 
harmful. Punishment of harmful brands can occur in many forms (e.g., willingness to lie, cheat, 
and steal) with consumers feeling no worse or less moral, as a result. Second, we show this 
punishment via unethical behaviors occurs towards brands that have not committed a 
transgression that directly impacts the consumer – a mere harmful reputation is sufficient.  
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Conceptual Background 
The tendency to punish harmful others has been shown to be generally innate and 
ubiquitous (Haidt, 2007; Henrich et al., 2001). Importantly, the punishment of harmful entities in 
the interpersonal domain often occurs even in the absence of a direct personal transgression 
(Haslam, 2006). The term harmfulness in this research captures an underlying harmful 
disposition, in which entities can be perceived as being disposed to harmful behaviors, regardless 
of maliciousness or capacity to act (Piazza, Landy, & Goodwin, 2014). As such research 
demonstrates, entities can come to be seen as harmful and punished in response to, or in the 
absence of, a specific personal transgression.  
We use the term harmful in the context of harm pluralism, which acknowledges the 
legitimacy of different varieties of harm and may include violations of fairness, loyalty, or purity 
(Schein & Gray, 2015). Perceptions of harm can be the result of physical or emotional harm as 
well as harm that damages society, the environment, or even the perception of harming one’s 
soul (Schein & Gray, 2015; Shweder, 2012). Thus, from this pluralist perspective, consumers’ 
subjective perceptions of harmfulness can be influenced by a variety of sources in the 
marketplace. For example, factors such as corporate social irresponsibility (Sweetin et al., 2013), 
poor brand reputation (Walsh & Beatty, 2007), company policy/day-to-day business practices 
(Forehand & Grier, 2003), and the general industry in which the firm operates (Yoon, Gürhan-
Canli, & Schwarz, 2006) all represent possible sources of perceived harmfulness. Since 
individuals can disagree in good faith about which actions or entities are harmful, for the purpose 
of this manuscript we focus on individuals’ lay perceptions of harmfulness. 
There may be no moral intuition more fundamental than the rejection of unwarranted 
harm and the subsequent need for justified retribution (Greene, 2012; Khamitov, Rotman, & 
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Piazza, 2016). Those who cause unjustified harm are considered to have violated an implicit 
social contract and thus are deserving of punishment (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Sousa & Piazza, 
2014). Although brand punishment, through either individual (Sweetin et al., 2013) or collective 
action (Klein, Smith, & John, 2004), has received ample attention by consumer psychologists, 
we extend this research and posit that consumers can come to see brands as harmful – even in the 
absence of a direct, personal transgression – and this can motivate them to seek out retribution in 
the form of unethical intentions and behaviors. That is, consumers will lie, cheat, or steal to 
punish a harmful brand. 
 
Study 1: Manipulating Brand Harmfulness 
Study 1 investigates the effect of harmfulness in a controlled setting using a fictitious 
brand. Specifically, we manipulate the harmfulness of a brand to examine the downstream 
consequences on intentions to punish via unethical means and marketplace aggression. 
 
Method 
One hundred and seventy participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(52% female, Mage = 35.7). Nineteen participants were removed for failing an attention check. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either a more harmful, less harmful or control brand 
condition. Participants in all three conditions were introduced to Tritan, a pharmaceutical 
company that produces drugs to treat Parkinson’s Disease and Brucellosis. In the more (less) 
harmful condition, participants were informed that Tritan’s marketing analysis determined that a 
300% increase in the price of their drugs would generate considerably more profit, despite some 
customers no longer being able to afford them, and that subsequently, Tritan raised (opted not to 
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raise) the price. In the control condition, pricing information was not mentioned. Next, 
participants were asked about their perceptions of harmfulness of Tritan using five adjectives (α 
= .96; adapted from Piazza et al., 2014). Finally, participants completed dependent measures of 
punishment intentions (α = .97), marketplace aggression (α = .78; Grégoire, Laufer, & Tripp, 
2010), hostile intentions (α = .91; Kähr et al., 2016) and intentions to punish via unethical means, 
which included participants’ willingness to lie, cheat, and steal to punish the brand (α = .90). See 
MDA for measures, summary statistics, and correlation matrices across studies. 
 
Results 
The harmfulness manipulation was successful, F(2,148) = 100.74, p < .001. Tritan was 
rated as more harmful in the more harmful condition (M = 5.95) than both in the less harmful (M 
= 2.54) and control conditions (M = 3.39). A one-way MANOVA yielded a significant 
multivariate effect of brand harmfulness, F(8,290) = 16.60, Wilk’s λ = .470, p < .001. Follow-up 
univariate ANOVAs indicate a significant effect across each dependent variable: punishment 
intentions F(2,148) = 59.34, p < .001, marketplace aggression F(2,148) = 14.24, p < .001, hostile 
intentions F(2,148) = 61.21, p < .001, and intentions to punish via unethical means F(2,148) = 
7.05, p < .01. Planned contrasts show that, in line with our prediction, Tritan yielded higher 
punishment in the more harmful condition (M = 4.43) than in the less harmful (M = 1.66, p < 
.001) or control conditions (M = 1.94, p < .001). Consistent contrasts were also found in terms of 
marketplace aggression, hostile intentions, and intentions to punish via unethical means (p’s < 
.05; Table 1). 11% of participants indicated they or someone close to them suffer from 
Parkinson’s Disease or Brucellosis, however, the results hold without these participants, 
suggesting the effects are not driven by a personal transgression. 
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 provide experimental evidence that perceptions of brand 
harmfulness increase intentions to punish via unethical means and marketplace aggression, even 
when the consumer is not directly harmed. Consumers evaluated the business decision of a brand 
as harmful to other consumers, which led to an increase in consumers’ willingness to punish the 
brand via unethical means. This suggests that the mere presence of a business decision that puts 
other consumers at risk may color the brand as harmful and expose it to unethical means of 
punishment from consumers. 
 
Study 2: Feeling No Worse and No Less Moral about Unethically Punishing Harmful 
Brands 
Models of ethical decision-making suggest that unethical behavior leads to important 
emotional consequences, in the form of diminished positive affect on the part of the actor 
(Baumeister et al., 2007; Eisenberg, 2000). When engaging in unethical behavior, individuals 
justify their actions through rationalization in order to preserve a favorable self-view (Gino, 
Ayal, & Ariely, 2009). Thus, when individuals act unethically to punish a harmful (vs. non-
harmful) brand, they should be able to justify this behavior more easily and, subsequently, 
should not experience any reduction in positive affect. This positive affect should be related to 
feeling more moral (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007) and, thus, consumers should feel no 
less moral acting unethically (vs. ethically) towards a harmful brand. Study 2 directly 
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manipulates harmfulness through brand reputation and then has participants engage in unethical 
(vs. ethical) acts of retribution to examine their feelings directly after engaging in brand 
punishment.  
 
Method 
One hundred and eighty undergraduate students (42% female, Mage = 21.4) were 
randomly assigned in a 2 (brand harmfulness: harm, no harm)  2 (consumer action: ethical, 
unethical) experimental design. Ten participants opted not to complete the task, leaving 170 
usable responses (see MDA for condition breakdown of removed participants). Participants were 
first presented with information from a “Federal Communications Commission Measuring Fixed 
Broadband Report” which differed between conditions to manipulate the perceived harmfulness 
of internet service providers (ISPs).  
In the harm condition, participants were informed that, on average, internet speeds 
experienced by customers in the USA are consistently below advertised speeds, and that this 
occurs due to a large number of ISPs intentionally capping internet speeds at 20% lower than 
advertised rates. We intentionally specified “on average” to ensure that no wrongdoing was 
attributable to any one ISP in particular. In the no-harm condition, participants were informed 
that, on average, actual internet speeds experienced by customers across the USA meet the 
speeds advertised by ISPs. Participants then completed a measure of the harmfulness of their 
own ISP as a manipulation check ( = .81). 
Next, we directly manipulated the ethicality of the participants’ action. Our use of 
internet service in this study was intentional as it represents an industry in which consumers’ 
experiences vary regularly (e.g., internet traffic, time of day). Evaluating the performance of 
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one’s internet service, therefore, can be ambiguous at best, making it possible to experimentally 
shift participants’ assessments of their experience (see MDA for a post-test verifying this 
assumption). In the ethical condition, participants were told that they have likely noticed their 
current internet services had underperformed and were asked to sign a letter to their ISP stating 
they would like to be compensated in the form of 10% off their monthly bill. In the unethical 
condition, participants were told that, although they likely have not noticed any issue with their 
internet service, they should sign the letter demanding compensation based on the content of the 
FCC report. To ensure that participants knew they were acting unethically, we emphasized: We 
would like you to lie for effect, as this is more likely to catch the company’s attention. 
Participants were then asked to address the pre-written letter to their ISP and endorse it 
with their name, signature, and email address. To make sure that participants believed their 
actions had real personal consequences, they were instructed to seal the letter in an envelope and 
place it in a folder corresponding to their own ISP so that it could be mailed to the appropriate 
company on their behalf. Letters were verified to ensure that the task had been properly 
completed by each participant. 
To assess feelings of morality, participants completed thought protocols asking how they 
felt following the task. Two coders coded participants’ feelings of moral self-thoughts (1 feeling 
immoral - 7 feeling moral), and a third coder resolved any discrepancies (Krippendorff’s α = 
.73). Finally, participants completed a measure of positive affect (α = .90; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) and indicated their current ISP and their attitudes towards it. 
 
Results 
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Participants rated their ISP as more harmful (M = 3.81) in the harm condition than in the 
no-harm condition (M = 3.13), F(1,166) = 12.55, p < .001. Importantly, there was no main effect 
of consumer action condition on perceptions of harmfulness (p = .93), nor a significant 
interaction (p = .87). There were also no differences between different ISPs on harmfulness (p = 
.89), providing evidence that our effects were not driven by differential levels of harmfulness 
across ISPs. 
Results indicate a significant harmfulness  consumer action interaction on positive 
affect, F(1,166) = 5.86, p < .05, and this effect holds when controlling for attitudes towards 
participants’ ISPs, F(1,165) = 5.72, p < .05. Planned contrasts indicate that in the no-harm 
condition participants felt significantly worse after engaging in unethical (M = 1.99) compared to 
ethical action (M = 2.37), F(1,166) = 4.94, p < .05. When the brand was portrayed as non-
harmful, participants felt worse when engaging in punishment via unethical (vs. ethical) 
behavior. However, in the harm condition, there was no difference in affect between the 
unethical or ethical conditions (Munethical = 2.22 vs. Methical = 2.02), F(1,166) = 1.43, p = .23. That 
is, when ISPs were portrayed as harmful, participants felt no worse after engaging in punishment 
via unethical (vs. ethical) behavior (Figure 1). It should be noted that, although directional, 
participants in the no-harm (vs. harm) condition did not feel significantly worse after engaging in 
unethical action (p = .16). However, we further examine this important contrast in relation to 
participants’ moral thoughts. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
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Examining participants’ moral thoughts shows a similar interaction, F(1,166) = 4.50, p < 
.05. Echoing the findings for affect, participants in the no-harm condition felt more immoral after 
engaging in an unethical (M = 3.66), compared to an ethical action (M = 4.17), F(1,166) = 6.40, 
p < .05., whereas, in the harm condition, there was no difference in moral thoughts between the 
ethical or unethical conditions (p = .65). Importantly, the intuitive finding, that engaging in 
punishment via unethical behavior would lead participants to feel more immoral in the no-harm 
condition (M = 3.66) compared to the harm condition (M = 4.09), was supported in this case, 
F(1,166) = 4.93, p < .05 (Figure 2). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
Discussion 
Our findings demonstrate that, as one would expect, when a brand is not perceived as 
harmful, consumers experience reduced positive affect and feel more immoral when engaging in 
unethical (vs. ethical) action (i.e., lying) to achieve a personal gain at a company’s expense. 
However, when a brand is perceived as harmful, consumers do not feel any worse, or less moral 
after engaging in an unethical act as compared to an ethical one.  
Given the intricacies of directly examining participants’ feelings after engaging in 
unethical lying behavior to punish a brand, this study was not without limitations. First, although 
it was made clear to participants at the beginning of the study that they did not have to take part 
in anything that made them feel uncomfortable, it is still possible that inducing participants to act 
unethically may have triggered a distinct rationalization process that may not have occurred if 
the behavior was entirely volitional. That is, inducing the behavior may have lead participants to 
search for means of justifying and feeling better about the behavior they had engaged in, rather 
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than the participants feeling no worse because of the harmfulness of the brand. Relatedly, it is 
possible that asking participants to complete the letter-writing task may have provided 
participants with an additional option to rationalize their unethical behavior (i.e., “because the 
experimenter asked me to”). However, this was not evidenced by participants’ thought protocols. 
Finally, while it is possible to question the ecological validity of the study, it should be noted that 
this type of lying or embellishing an experience to amplify its severity is not unheard of in the 
retail and service industries. 
 
Study 3: Engaging in Unethical Actions towards Harmful Brands 
Thus far we have explored the effects of brand harmfulness on theft, fraud, and 
punishment with self-reported or correlational data. In Study 3, we demonstrate this effect using 
a behavioral dependent measure of unethical action. It is expected that when it comes to harmful 
(non-harmful) brands, consumers will punish such brands more (less) in the form of cheating for 
unethical financial gain. 
 
Method 
One hundred and ninety-nine undergraduate students (52% female, Mage = 18.5) were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions: (harmful brand, non-harmful brand, control). In 
the harmful (non-harmful) condition, participants were told the study was being sponsored by 
Bell Canada (Tim Hortons Canada) and were asked if they currently are, or have ever been, a 
customer. In the control condition, no brand was assigned.  
A pre-test (N = 52) confirmed participants viewed Bell as more harmful (M = 3.29) 
compared to Tim Hortons (M = 2.67), t(50) = 2.46, p < .05. The two brands did not differ on 
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other attributes such as whether they were seen as a large employer, industry leader, large 
corporation, rich, international, well-established, beneficial, or useful. A post-test conducted 
using a more robust measure of harmfulness confirmed these perceptions (MBell = 4.01 vs. 
MTimHortons = 2.91), t(87) = 9.05, p < .001 (see MDA for Study 3 post-test).  
Participants in all conditions were then asked to complete a matrix task (Mazar, Amir, & 
Ariely, 2008). The number of matrices solved served as a proxy for cheating behavior and thus 
was used as a dependent measure of unethical behavior in this study. The matrix task gauges 
how dishonestly individuals behave in terms of over-reporting the actual quantity of matrices 
solved (Mazar et al., 2008). Participants were asked to solve as many of 20 numeric matrices as 
they could in three minutes. To incentivize participants, they were informed that two participants 
would be chosen at random to receive $2.00 for each matrix solved. It was made clear to all 
participants they would get to keep their answer sheet to ensure the survey was confidential and 
anonymous. This was done to ensure that participants did not think the experimenter would 
check answers given on the test sheet, which could curb cheating. Participants were simply asked 
to report how many matrices they solved. We also collected a possible mediating measure of 
moral worth (Piazza et al., 2014) for exploratory purposes in this study (see MDA for Study 3: 
Mediation Analysis). 
 
Results 
Consistent with our predictions, results indicate a significant effect of harm on the 
magnitude of cheating, F(2,196) = 3.38, p < .05. Participants in the harmful condition cheated 
more (M = 8.59) than participants in both the control condition (M = 6.43, p < .05) and the non-
harmful condition (M = 6.54, p < .05). As expected, no differences were observed between the 
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non-harmful and control conditions (p > .90). Furthermore, these findings held when controlling 
for past experience with the brand (p < .05). 
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 3 provide behavioral evidence that a brand’s perceived harmfulness 
can influence consumer punishment, in the form of unethical behaviors such as cheating. 
Specifically, participants cheated more when they were led to believe the study was sponsored 
by a harmful brand than either by a non-harmful brand or when it was unsponsored.  
 
General Discussion 
Across four studies we find that consumers can lie, cheat, and steal to punish a harmful 
brand, even in the absence of any direct, personal transgression. When consumers see a brand as 
harmful, they exhibit unethical intentions and behaviors and subsequently feel no worse and no 
less moral acting unethically towards the brand. 
These findings open up several promising avenues for future research. First, further work 
is required to fully understand the underlying mechanism(s). While we provide preliminary 
evidence in favor of a moral reasoning account (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012) – entities 
perceived as harmful are attributed lower moral worth and subsequently deemed deserving of 
unethical treatment (see MDA for Study 2b) – other mechanisms could be driving the observed 
effects. For instance, in line with extant work on cheating, consumers may engage in unethical 
behavior by means of uncoupling their actions from their moral standards (e.g., denying that any 
harm was done; Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011), or by justifying their engagement in unethical 
actions by dehumanizing the harmful brand (Khamitov et al., 2016). Finally, researchers may 
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consider other alternative mechanisms such as anger, vengeance, or restoring honor (Grégoire et 
al., 2010; May, Monga, & Kalaignanam, 2015). 
Second, although this research examines consumers’ lay perceptions of harmfulness in a 
variety of contexts (e.g., brand reputation, CSR, firm policies), more work is needed to 
systematically investigate the antecedents of harmfulness as well as the potential differential 
effects of these sources on punishment via unethical behavior. As noted, lay perceptions of 
harmfulness can be related to corporate social irresponsibility and a negative brand reputation, 
but whether irresponsibility or a poor reputation are sufficient for the perception of harmfulness 
remains an open question. Consumers may be aware of socially irresponsible business practices, 
such as the use of FoxConn by Apple, but not see the brand as harmful. A more thorough 
understanding of the particular triggers that push consumers into the unethical brand punishment 
realm, and when/why such punitive actions might verge on unethicality, could help establish a 
more nuanced understanding of diverse phenomena such as adversarial consumer-brand 
relationships as well as unethical consumption behaviors (e.g., over-claiming on insurance, credit 
card and electricity fraud, cheating on service guarantees). 
Another interesting question that emerges is whether some consumers are not willing to 
‘cross the line’ when it comes to unethical intentions and behaviors towards harmful brands. 
Although a substantial number of consumers exhibit some level of punishment via unethical 
behavior across our studies, others simply do not. This may help to explain why, despite 
demonstrating significant differences in unethical intentions and behaviors across our 
experimental conditions, the cell means for some of our dependent variables were relatively low 
in an absolute sense (i.e., below the scale midpoint). Certain consumers may take a deontological 
view on morality whereby moral rules are black and white, and stealing or cheating is always 
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considered wrong (Love, Staton, & Rotman, 2016). Conversely, if some consumers are inclined 
to perceive their unethical treatment of harmful brands as morally justified, then such behaviors 
should be more likely to emerge among those consumers who are more chronically sensitive to 
justice violations than among those who are less so (Colquitt, 2001; Schmitt et al., 2010). A 
supplementary study supports this prediction (see MDA for Study 3b). Other individual 
differences such as honor values (May et al., 2015) or eagerness for vengeance (Stuckless & 
Goranson, 1992) may also moderate the above effects, such that individuals who are chronically 
high on these dimensions may be more likely to engage in unethical behavior to satisfy their 
needs. 
Although we focus on harmfulness, violations of other moral foundations (e.g., fairness 
or loyalty to the in-group; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) may similarly result in punishment 
via unethical behavior. Recent research has suggested that the moral foundations may be 
subsumed under the umbrella of harmfulness (Schein & Gray, 2015), and thus violations in these 
other moral domains should result in a similar pattern of unethical behavior. 
Importantly, this research also has substantive implications for practitioners. Consider the 
explosion of anti-brand websites, from 550 to 10,500 between 1997 and 2004 (Fitzgerald, 2000; 
Krishnamurthy & Kucuk, 2009). A simple internet search for Walmart yields an online 
community “Wear your Wrath for Walmart” (hel-mart.com); a Facebook group called “Anti 
Wal-Mart”; and a poll asking if it is acceptable to steal from Walmart, in which 17.5% of 
individuals answered “Yes, Walmart is evil and should burn in hell” (escapistmagazine.com). 
Relatedly, Walmart has reported losses of $3 billion dollars annually because of consumer 
shoplifting and wardrobing (Matthews, 2015). These consumer actions lend empirical credence 
to the phenomenon of brand punishment via unethical behavior, even when the consumer is not 
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personally harmed. Accordingly, we call on other researchers to continue examining how and 
why consumers engage in unethical actions towards brands. A more precise understanding of 
which consumers see unethical treatment as morally acceptable and why consumers come to 
believe a brand is harmful, provides exciting opportunities for consumer psychologists to more 
fully understand the phenomenon of brand punishment via unethical behavior. 
 
  
19 
 
References 
Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., DeWall, C. N., & Zhang, L. (2007). How emotion shapes 
behavior: Feedback, anticipation, and reflection, rather than direct causation. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 11(2), 167-203. 
Checkpoint Systems (2014). The global retail theft barometer. Retrieved from http://netmap.com. 
au/files/Global%20Retail%20Theft%20Barometer%202014.pdf. 
CNBC (2015). Shoplifting, other fraud cost US retailers $44 billion in 2014: Survey. Retrieved 
from http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/24/shoplifting-other-fraud-cost-us-retailers-44-
billion-in-2014-survey.html. 
Colquitt, J. A. (2001). On the dimensionality of organizational justice: A construct validation of 
a measure. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(3), 386-400.  
Darley, J. M., & Pittman, T. S. (2003). The psychology of compensatory and retributive justice. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7(4), 324-36. 
Dawar, N., & Lei, J. (2009). Brand crises: The roles of brand familiarity and crisis relevance in 
determining the impact on brand evaluations. Journal of Business Research, 62(4), 509-
16. 
Eisenberg, N. (2000). Emotion, regulation, and moral development. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 51, 665-97. 
Fitzgerald, K. (2000). New domain suffixes rich for profiteers. Advertising Age, 71(51), 58-60. 
Forehand, M. R., & Grier, S. (2003). When is honesty the best policy? The effect of stated 
company intent on consumer skepticism. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 13(3), 349-
56. 
20 
 
Gino, F., Ayal, S., & Ariely, D. (2009). Contagion and differentiation in unethical behavior: The 
effect of one bad apple on the barrel. Psychological Science, 20(3), 393-98. 
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of 
moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(5), 1029-46. 
Gray, K., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2012). Mind perception is the essence of morality. 
Psychological Inquiry, 23(2), 101-24. 
Greene, J. D. (2012). The moral brain and how to use it. New York, NY: Penguin Group. 
Grégoire, Y., & Fisher, R. J. (2006). The effects of relationship quality on customer retaliation. 
Marketing Letters, 17(1), 31-46. 
Grégoire, Y., & Fisher, R. J. (2008). Customer betrayal and retaliation: When your best 
customers become your worst enemies. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 
36(2), 247-61. 
Grégoire, Y., Laufer, D., & Tripp, T. M. (2010). A comprehensive model of customer direct and 
indirect revenge: Understanding the effects of perceived greed and customer power. 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 38(6), 738-58. 
Haidt, J. (2007). The new synthesis in moral psychology. Science, 316(5827), 998-1002. 
Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 10(3), 252-64. 
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., & McElreath, R. (2001). In 
search of Homo economicus: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. The 
American Economic Review, 91(2), 73-78. 
Huber, F., Vollhardt, K., Matthes, I., & Vogel, J. (2010). Brand misconduct: Consequences on 
consumer-brand relationships. Journal of Business Research, 63(11), 1113-20. 
21 
 
John, A., & Klein, J. (2003). The boycott puzzle: Consumer motivations for purchase sacrifice. 
Management Science, 49(9), 1196-209. 
Kähr, A., Nyffenegger, B., Krohmer, H., & Hoyer, W. D. (2016). When hostile consumers wreak 
havoc on your brand: The phenomenon of consumer brand sabotage. Journal of 
Marketing, 80(3), 25-41. 
Khamitov, M., Rotman, J. D., & Piazza, J. (2016). Perceiving the agency of harmful agents: A 
test of dehumanization versus moral typecasting accounts. Cognition, 146, 33-47. 
Klein, J. G., Smith, N. C., & John, A. (2004). Why we boycott: Consumer motivations for 
boycott participation. Journal of Marketing, 68(3), 92-109. 
Krishnamurthy, S., & Kucuk, S. U. (2009). Anti-branding on the Internet. Journal of Business 
Research, 62(11), 1119-26. 
Love, E., Staton, M., & Rotman, J. D. (2016). Loyalty as a matter of principle: The influence of 
standards of judgment on customer loyalty. Marketing Letters, 27(4), 661-74.  
Matthews, C. (2015). Here’s how much Walmart loses every year to theft. Retrieved from 
http://fortune.com/2015/06/05/walmart-theft/. 
May, F., Monga, A. B., & Kalaignanam, K. (2015). Consumer responses to brand failures: The 
neglected role of honor values. In D. J. MacInnis & C. W. Park (Eds.), Brand meaning 
management (Review of Marketing Research, Vol. 12, pp. 257-91). Bingley, UK: 
Emerald. 
Mazar, N., Amir, O., & Ariely, D. (2008). The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of self-
concept maintenance. Journal of Marketing Research, 45(6), 633-44. 
Piazza, J., Landy, J. F., & Goodwin, G. P. (2014). Cruel nature: Harmfulness as an important, 
overlooked dimension in judgments of moral worth. Cognition, 131(1), 108-24. 
22 
 
Prevent Loss (2015). The costs of “Wardrobing”. Retrieved from http://preventshopliftingloss. 
net/the-costs-of-wardrobing/. 
Reynolds, S. J., & Ceranic, T. L. (2007). The effects of moral judgment and moral identity on 
moral behavior: An empirical examination of the moral individual. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 92(6), 1610-24. 
Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2015). The unifying moral dyad: Liberals and conservatives share the 
same harm-based moral template. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(8), 
1147-63. 
Schmitt, M., Baumert, A., Gollwitzer, M., & Maes, J. (2010). The justice sensitivity inventory: 
Factorial validity, location in the personality facet space, demographic pattern, and 
normative data. Social Justice Research, 23(2-3), 211-38. 
Shu, L. L., Gino, F., & Bazerman, M. H. (2011). Dishonest deed, clear conscience: When 
cheating leads to moral disengagement and motivated forgetting. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 37(3), 330-49. 
Shweder, R. A. (2012). Relativism and universalism. In D. Fassin (Ed.), A companion to moral 
anthropology (pp. 85-102). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. 
Sousa, P., & Piazza, J. (2014). Harmful transgressions qua moral transgressions: A deflationary 
view. Thinking and Reasoning, 20(1), 99-128.  
Stuckless, N., & Goranson, R. (1992). The Vengeance scale: Development of a measure of 
attitudes toward revenge. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 7(1), 25-42. 
Sweetin, V. H., Knowles, L. L., Summey, J. H., & McQueen, K. S. (2013). Willingness-to-
punish the corporate brand for corporate social irresponsibility. Journal of Business 
Research, 66(10), 1822-30. 
23 
 
Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. (2007). Moral emotions and moral behavior. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 58, 345-72. 
Treviño, L. K., Weaver, G. R., & Reynolds, S. J. (2006). Behavioral ethics in organizations: A 
review. Journal of Management, 32(6), 951-90. 
Walsh, G., & Beatty, S. E. (2007). Customer-based corporate reputation of a service firm: Scale 
development and validation. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 35(1), 127-
43. 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures 
of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 54(6), 1063-70. 
Watson, P. J. (2015). Ashley Madison leak reveals thousands of government email addresses. 
Retrieved from http://www.infowars.com/ashley-madison-leak-reveals-thousands-of-
government-email-addresses/. 
Yoon, Y., Gürhan-Canli, Z., & Schwarz, N. (2006). The effect of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) activities on companies with bad reputations. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 
16(4), 377-90. 
  
24 
 
Table 1: Study 1 Summary Statistics 
 Harmful  
(N = 53) 
Control  
(N = 44) 
Non-Harmful 
(N = 54) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Punishment  
Intentions 4.43a 1.66 1.94b 1.20 1.66b 1.35 
Marketplace 
Aggression 2.41a 1.34 1.64b .98 1.34b .79 
Hostile 
Intentions 3.99a 1.47 1.86b 1.02 1.53b 1.13 
Unethical 
Punishment 
2.11a 1.60 1.56b .98 1.27b .78 
                a, b: for each DV, means with different subscripts denote a statistically significant difference (p < .05) 
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Figure 1: Harmfulness X Action Ethicality on Affect (Study 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Figure 2. Harmfulness X Action Ethicality on Moral Thoughts (Study 2) 
 
